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Abstract
For economists, what matters is not how ecosystem services are classified, but what change in human well-being
results from increasing, reducing or qualitatively varying their supply. Eight general approaches are available for
valuing non-market effects: marketable benefits may be generated or lost elsewhere in the economy; costs may be
imposed or alleviated elsewhere; costs willingly incurred by past decision-makers may be taken as indicating their
valuation; sufficiently similar services may be traded elsewhere; consumers may voluntarily support “good causes”,
including through price premia for environmentally friendly production; individuals may be asked their hypothetical
willingness to pay for change in an environmental condition; experts may estimate what a reasonable willingness
to pay might be; market products may exist which give access to ecosystem services or escape from disservices.
All approaches have drawn criticism, which itself has drawn rebuttal and improvement from their proponents. All
approaches have been applied to the regulating and supporting effects of forests on the qualities of land,
watercourses, atmosphere and biological resources. Enormous valuations may be given when consumers attribute
symbolic significance to or derive a “warm glow” from favouring a particular ecosystem. This may arise in response
to questionnaires or by paying premia for certified goods. But directly elicited or implicitly accepted willingness to
pay for ecosystem services requires consumers to have improbable understanding of processes: willingness to pay
for final products, services or disservices delivered to the consumer is a more appropriate basis. Planted forests may
have adverse as well as beneficial effects on watercourses, e.g. by reducing hydroelectricity output. With rapidly
rising carbon prices, the carbon transactions of a single commercial forest cycle may have negative overall value.
These examples illustrate that results may be surprising, but all of them are context dependent. Foresters should
not regard economics as intrinsically hostile to ecosystem service provision, nor assume that forestry is always
favoured by economic valuation of those services.
Introduction: ecosystems and services
Ecosystem services are now routinely placed under the
four categories recognised in Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (2005). Provisioning services generate physi-
cal products: what used to be called goods, including
timber, and non-timber forest products. Arguably, since
economics traditionally separated goods (things) from
services (actions), this provisioning category is an
unhelpful blurring of a long-understood distinction.
Regulating services are processes that improve the phy-
sical environment for specific human purposes: effects on
attributes of atmosphere, watercourses and land surfaces,
and on populations of biological agents, such as pests,
which have economic significance. Formerly, such effects
were called “forest influences” (Kittredge, 1948).
Cultural services are sensory experiences of the eco-
system that enhance human well-being aesthetically and
spiritually.
Supporting services aid the functioning of ecosystems,
without delivering any products or varying any environ-
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include gene conservation, soil formation and nutrient
recycling. To illustrate, humans derive no direct pleasure
from observing nutrient recycling in forests, but rather
from the forest products and environmental conditions
that nutrient cycling supports. If the contribution of sup-
porting services to generation of direct human benefits
were evaluated and added to the direct value, there would
be illegitimate double-counting of benefit. This ought to
be evident, but where teams of researchers independently
value different ecosystem services, such double-counting
might occur.
Services arising within a landscape may be improperly
attributed to one particular configuration of ecosystem.
For example, in the Corsican pine (Pinus nigra var. mari-
tima (Ait.) Melville) forest of Newborough, North Wales,
dune slacks contain the national rarity, round-leaved
wintergreen (Pyrola rotundifolia L.). But the plant is also
found in the adjoining, unforested national nature
reserve. The agencies protecting both these ecosystem
configurations note the valuable presence of the plant
within their own boundaries. But, whatever other services
the forest itself provides, the entire benefits of the winter-
green’s survival should not be included. The key question
is: what changes in the delivery of ecosystem services,
when the configuration of land use changes?
The concern of this paper is with regulating and sup-
porting services: provisioning and cultural services are
mentioned only in passing. It reviews illustrative results
from numerous published and a few unpublished case
studies, with the objective of highlighting the problems,
as well as the clarifications, that may arise through
valuation. Some pointers are given to how problems
might be addressed.
Approaches to valuation
Environmental economists are often asked: “How can you
put a price on the song of a nightingale heard in a moonlit
wood?” - or any similarly emotive example of an ecosystem
service. The question is rhetorical: the enquirer neither
expects an answer, nor wants one. The economist is meant
to retreat, baffled, defeated, conspicuously shallow in think-
ing. One possible, non-rhetorical answer, however, is:
“There are eight basic approaches. Do you want to con-
sider them all?” These approaches are listed below, with
examples relevant to regulating and supporting services.
Some examples date back many years, showing that recent
preoccupations with ecosystem valuation build on a long
tradition in economics.
Many reviews and applications of such approaches have
been written in the 21st century, e.g. Willis et al. (2003);
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005); Watson and
Albon (2011); Eastwood et al. (2013). The last-mentioned
emphasises the variability of values with context: results
such as those reported below need not apply in different
physical and social contexts, though the approaches them-
selves remain relevant.
Marketable benefits are created or lost elsewhere in the
economy through ecosystem services
A straightforward example is wind shelter from planted
trees. Significant shelter may be provided at the boundary
between forest and pastoral land ownerships, shelter then
being a classical economic externality: the benefit is
matched by neither monetary remuneration nor benefit in
kind to the forest owner. However, reduced wind-speed
reduces heat loss from out-wintered livestock, which
reduces energy consumption for temperature mainte-
nance, reducing winter weight loss and increasing survival
of offspring. Applying sale prices to the increased output
gives the economic consequence of shelter. Note immedi-
ately that good ecosystem economics is not opposed to
good ecosystem science, but is necessarily based on it.
Energy conservation enters the valuation via measurement
of physical response to changed environment. In an
experiment in Eddleston Forest near Edinburgh in the
1980s, “artificial sheep” were used in open and forest con-
ditions, the energy consumption entailed in maintaining
mammalian body temperature being measured, inside
simulated insulating layers.
Pollination by insects is a regulating service for eco-
nomic crops. Planted forests may provide islands of
mixed and durable habitat for pollinators, in a sea of
single-species agricultural crops (Price and Willis, 1994).
The value of services is the increase in net cash yield of
crops, relative to that achieved through self- or wind-
pollination, or with loss of a particular pollinator species
or its habitat.
But pollination provides a further, supporting service to
plants of no direct economic significance: this is harder
to value.
Financial costs are saved, imposed, or voluntarily
undertaken elsewhere in the economy, through
ecosystem effects
This being the most widely used approach for regulating
services, several examples are given. The common pre-
mise is that, without regulating services, expenditure
would be needed either to achieve equivalent regulation,
or to remedy the consequences of an unregulated
system.
The avalanche protection afforded by Swiss forests
exemplifies the former. Seymour and Girardet (1986)
calculated that engineering works to give equivalent
protection would cost £200,000 million (almost twice
Switzerland’s gross national product (GNP) at the time).
Imposed remedial costs are exemplified by floods,
attention being recently focused by increased frequency
of intense rainfall events, attributed to climate change,
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such that pre-existing protection no longer suffices.
Illustrative calculations, drawn from an outline valuation
of forests in the South-west Region of England are pro-
vided in Table 1 (Ekos et al., 2009).
These figures are highly provisional. Only thoughtful
speculation informs estimates for non-insurable flood
losses, for future flood frequency, for flood reduction by
trees and for translation from flood reduction to flood
damage reduction. There is danger in presenting such
figures: for lack of other monetary calculations, they
may be seized on and quoted, as though no caveats had
been made. The data in Table 1 merely illustrate the
kind of calculation required, and the large possible dif-
ferences in result, even within reasonable assumptions.
The most intensively studied regulating effects are
those on atmospheric CO2, and hence on global climate.
Much present economic analysis concentrates on the
relative costs of mitigation of CO2 levels by many
options - of which, planting forests is one (Valatin and
Price, 2014). Nijnik et al (2012) show that the cost of
the forestry options is sensitive to location, forest pro-
ductivity and the type of agriculture displaced.
Other major work examines the costs of continued
accumulation of CO2, including:
• Mitigation costs, for example more temperature
amelioration expenditure
• Damage costs, like those from increased storminess
(as in Table 1)
• Health costs through heat stress or migration of
disease zones. An additional 35,000 deaths were
attributed to extreme temperatures in Western
Europe during the summer of 2003 (Stern, 2006).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (1996) calculated the cost of a life (in rich
countries) at $1.5 million. Although such figures are
naturally controversial (especially if it is argued that
these deaths would have been concentrated among
elderly people with no “economic” life left), they
potentially improve the case for reducing CO2
emissions.
• Defensive costs, like constructing sea walls. An
untraced reference estimated that it would cost
$130 billion to build a sea wall sufficient to protect
Bangladesh from the effects of 21st century sea-
level rise. This is approximately twice Bangladesh’s
present GNP.
• Retreat costs, like rebuilding cities in less vulner-
able locations. Relocating a city like London, much
of which lies close to sea level, could not cost less
than several times the GNP.
Additional to these financial outlays are opportunity
costs of lost agricultural production (approach (1)
above), as through sea level rise, or water stress on
plants. Europe’s dry summer of 2003 caused an esti-
mated €15 billion loss of agricultural production
(Stern, 2006).
Trees also ameliorate microclimate. McPherson et al.
(1999) estimated that a tree in a Californian urban area
saved 122 kWh/year in electricity used for air condition-
ing. Converted to cash value via the unit cost of electricity
implies for the UK a value of £17 per tree per year. But
the savings are highly sensitive to climate, configuration of
Table 1 One-year cost of “extreme” flood events, South-west Region
Factor Operator Lower bound Upper bound
Insurable flood losses in England & Wales (E&W)* £3000 M/yr
Non-insurable flood losses (guessed) + £2000 M/yr
Total flood losses = £5000 M/yr £5000 M/yr
Return period of extreme events (guessed) ÷ 10 years Annual
Annual extreme event losses = £500 M/yr £5000 M/yr
South-west Region: 9% E&W population 16% E&W land area hence (approximately) × 12% of national damage
Apportioned damage = £60 M/yr £600 M/yr
Extreme event flood reduction by “optimally located trees"† × 5%
% trees “optimally located"‡ × 8.9%
Extreme event flood reduction by “full tree cover"† × 36%
% “full woodland cover"‡ × 8.9%
Area of tree cover ÷ 212 000 ha
Reduction of flood damage = £1.3 / ha / year £91 / ha / year
* Environment Agency (2007)
† Flood Risk Management Research Consortium (2008). Flood damage reduction is considered proportional to physical flood reduction, in absence of better
quantification.
‡ On the assumption that the 8.9% tree cover is presently located randomly, rather than optimally, in respect of flood reduction.
Price New Zealand Journal of Forestry Science 2014, 44(Suppl 1):S5
http://www.nzjforestryscience.com/content/44/S1/S5
Page 3 of 10
trees (street trees vs peri-urban forest) and culture of
energy use.
These illustrative calculations clarify that:
• the value of ecosystem services may significantly
improve the economics of planted forests, but
• vary with context and assumptions; and that
• difficulties may lie less in the economics, than in
the environmental science connecting land use
change with its physical consequences for humans.
Costs (including opportunity costs) of past decisions,
made to favour non-market benefits or abate non-market
costs, indicate presumed benefit, or cost
A sample calculation, concerning restoration of mire eco-
systems on the England/Scotland border, is given in
Table 2. Before the importance of these ecosystems was
recognised, planting with commercial Sitka spruce (Picea
sitchensis (Bong.) Carr) had lowered the water table suffi-
ciently to change the Sphagnum-dominated vegetation,
with loss of characteristic mire species. It was decided
not to replant 600 ha after felling the initial crop, with
loss of all future timber revenues (and costs of obtaining
them). This would have been rational only if the ecosys-
tem benefits exceeded the lost net revenue.
This calculation assumes no discounting of cash flow.
With a 6% discount rate (which was mandatory when the
decision was taken), the calculations look very different.
Since plantation forestry under this discount rate is
unprofitable, there is an annual net benefit, £11,400, in
not replanting. Again, the implicit value of the mires’ reg-
ulating and supporting services depends critically on
which set of assumptions is made. In this case, as often,
the discount rate is the key variable (Price, 1993; UK
Treasury, nd).
In any case, the premise behind this approach only
succeeds if past decisions were taken with good
understanding of both the science and the economics of
the system. The questions are therefore raised:
• were past decision-makers well informed?
• were decisions taken entirely for the benefit of
society?
• why can present decision makers not use similar
information, to make a primary decision, rather than
deriving valuations from past decisions?
Similar products are marketed elsewhere in the economy
Forests support in situ gene conservation, not only for
identified human benefit, but to underpin continuing
ecosystem functionality. These benefits are sometimes
called “quasi-option values” in the economics literature,
though much confusion exists over categories of biodi-
versity value )i. Such services are purchased neither at
source (in the forest) nor at the point of delivery (because
the precise beneficent properties remain unidentified).
Nonetheless, similar services do seem to be sold in bota-
nical gardens, where a broad spread of genetic material
may be cultivated, and an entrance fee - typically several
pounds, euros or dollars per visitor - may be charged.
Here, however, a problem arises that dogs attempts to link
actual payment to actual value. People visit botanical gar-
dens to gain various services, among which cultural values
may be more important than supporting values. Moreover,
supporting values may be enjoyed by “free-riding” on the
contributions of others - even if I don’t pay to visit a bota-
nical garden, I am not excluded from the values of either
in situ or ex situ gene conservation: the benefits of func-
tioning ecosystems accrue to all human beings. Although
Marwell and Ames (1981) argue that not everyone free-
rides all the time, undoubtedly some people, perhaps the
majority, do so for some, and perhaps for most, of the
time, if that option is available.
The further problem exists, of whether conservation of
a particular genetic base depends on maintenance of a
particular ecosystem configuration at a particular place;
or whether that base might survive sufficiently under
different land uses or in different locations. Such possi-
bilities greatly reduce the value legitimately attributed to
any particular act of gene conservation (Simpson et al.,
1996).
Voluntary subscriptions are made to related causes
Despite free-riding, people do make voluntary subscrip-
tions to support ecosystem services: by contributions in
collecting boxes on site, on the streets, or at their doors.
They join bodies like the UK Woodland Trust, whose
properties are nonetheless open to non-members. They
buy provenanced or organic food, and fairly traded
clothing, and products made from certified timber - not
Table 2 Implicit value of the supporting services of a
Border mire
Factor Magnitude
Annual yield 10 m3/ha
Rotation 40 years
Price/m3 £15 (after harvesting costs)
Establishment cost £800/ha
Management cost £5/ha/yr
Mean annual revenue £15/m3 × 10 m3/ha = £150/ha
Establishment cost ÷ rotation £20/ha/yr
Mean annual earning £150 - £20 - £5 = £125/ha
Area affected 600 ha
Total annual opportunity cost £75 000
Source: own calculations, based on historic Forestry Commission advice
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for better product performance, but because they prefer
the mode of production.
The theory of economically rational behaviour attributes
such free-will offerings to the “warm glow” that arises
from “acting rightly” or “being seen to act rightly”. It gives
genuine satisfaction to individuals who contribute, which
is denied to whomsoever does not contribute: it is a classi-
cal private good, susceptible to market valuation.
How this value relates to real improvement in delivery
of ecosystem services is discussed in the section on cer-
tification premiums.
Consumer-citizens are asked their willingness to pay for a
product, or the compensation required for suffering a
“bad”ii
This “stated preference” approach, attributed to Davis
(1963), is most commonly applied and known from con-
tingent valuation, the subject of thousands of published
papers. It is, potentially, flexible, allowing any existing
environmental condition to be encapsulated, and con-
trasted with any hypothetical alternative condition. For
example, a photograph of a coastal forest of Corsican
pine in North Wales could be contrasted with a version
manipulated digitally to remove the tree cover. The
question might be asked: “What would you be willing to
pay to maintain the sand-dune stabilising functions of
this forest?” The hypothetical alternative to maintaining
the supporting services is whatever would be provided
by the landscape without the forest.
The answer obtained depends critically on how the
question is phrased. The same with-and-without pictures
could accompany a question such as “What would you
be willing to pay to remove the influence of these alien
conifers from this landscape?” Unfortunately, the ques-
tion’s phrasing may depend on who sponsors the
research, and what their agenda might be.
Such political problems apart, many difficulties remain
for honest, unbiased researchers in eliciting an honest,
unbiased answer: these are a major preoccupation of the
literature. Confronting a respondent with a trade-off
between good environment and a range of willingnesses
to pay may prompt a desire to show general concern for
the environment: thus the highest suggested sum of
money may be selected. An obvious further difficulty lies
in separating willingness to pay for regulating and sup-
porting services, from willingness to pay for the aesthetic
impressions comprising cultural services.
Some formats of question seek to avoid these pro-
blems by offering choice among packages, each of which
offers different levels of several environmental attributes
and different monetary sums: this diminishes the envir-
onment-versus-money polarisation, and enables explora-
tion of which attributes are actually valued.
But problems with symbolic values remain. Nielsen et
al (2007) found high willingness to pay for a forest con-
taining standing deadwood, but only the smallest offered
amount of it. The authors suggest that this represents a
symbolic gesture towards the supporting services that
deadwood offers to detritivores, without excessively
compromising a personal preference for the cultural ser-
vice of a tidy, well-managed woodland.
Also advocated (Ovaskainen and Kniivilä, 2005) are
contingent referendum formats, where respondents are
asked to vote on a proposal offering both higher levels
of environmental quality and higher amounts of taxa-
tion. This format seemingly brings decisions into the
realm of altruistic public choice, rather than self-centred
pursuit of personal gain. Price (2006a) suggested, how-
ever, that such citizen responses, carefully elicited, may
actually give the researcher what is needed: a true valua-
tion of personal benefit from ecosystem services.
These and other issues in stated-preference approaches
are further discussed in the section on information bias.
Decision makers or experts ask themselves questions as
in the section above, or get a “feel” for acceptable
answers
The above difficulties may be circumvented by decision
makers’ introspection about their own willingness to
pay. This also avoids time and effort spent in eliciting
responses from individuals, many of whom have deep
difficulty with the concept of trading environment
against money (Clark et al., 2000).
Consider the question “What would it be reasonable
for me personally to pay for the song of a nightingale,
and for the reproductive strategy for genes that it repre-
sents?” An unreasonably large answer might be £1 mil-
lion, and an unreasonably small one, 10 pence. It then
only remains to define the range within which a reason-
able answer might lie. The problem once again, how-
ever, lies in segregating values attributable to supporting
services for the gene pool, and to cultural services to
the observer.
This approach is more appropriate to cultural services,
but here arises another problem, of how representative
an expert is of the wider population’s values. Clearly an
expert ornithologist, through inclination and training,
would value bird-song in an appropriate habitat, more
highly than would the population generally.
Arguably also, where experts have superior expertise
and insight, they should use those, rather than gut feel-
ing, to value supporting services, via approaches such as
those described above.
One case where expert valuation has become embedded
is the Helliwell system for valuing amenity trees, based on
expertly judged tree characteristics (Helliwell, 1967;
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Arboricultural Association, 2008). By explicitly stating its
value assumptions, it has gained professional consensus
and thus consistency. An equivalent, though less used, sys-
tem exists for woodlands, described in the Arboricultural
Association publication.
Willingness to pay is analysed for market goods that
provide access to non-market goods
Within this approach, the hedonic pricing model is popu-
lar. It hypothesises that willingness to pay for a bundle of
services, as embodied in house purchase, reflects the bun-
dle’s attributes: for example size and quality of building
and its locational attributes. The aesthetic qualities that
trees impart to a landscape form one attribute. Statistical
analysis of sale prices for houses offering diverse combina-
tions of attributes allows a value to be assigned to each
attribute. First applied by Payne and Strom (1973) to street
trees, the approach was extended to planted forests by
Willis and Garrod (1992), and it excited media attention
when reproduced in the National Ecosystem Assessment
(Watson and Albon, 2011).
For urban trees and peri-urban forests, the cultural
services are the ones most readily and commonly
valued, since many regulating and supporting services
are available to consumers without purchase of a house
located close to the trees (microclimate amelioration
being the exception). Price (2012) gave a critique of
hedonic pricing of the cultural attributes of trees, draw-
ing particular attention to how composition of elements,
such as trees and rivers, influences aesthetic quality, but
may not be - perhaps cannot be - represented among
the attributes.
Collinearity between attributes is also a problem. For
example, houses benefiting from views over a river (posi-
tively valued) may also be more liable to flooding (nega-
tively valued). Obversely, the tendency of good views and
appropriate tree planting to attract wealthy purchasers
creates a “good neighbourhood” effect that spuriously
enhances the derived good-view premium (Price, 1995).
The hedonic pricing model has potential in evaluating
regulating services, for example in terms of the price
discount on houses liable to flooding. However, it does
not offer a direct valuation of forests’ role in ameliorat-
ing floods. To achieve this requires further investigation,
using approaches outlined in the section on financial
costs.
Some surprising case study results
The ethos of ecosystem services valuation has, since the
topic became fashionable, suggested that the process
will favour maintenance of ecosystems generally (Wat-
son and Albon, 2011). However, not all outcomes are as
might be desired or expected. The following sections
present some selected results.
Information bias: the more you tell them, the more they
act like experts
In the 1980s, afforestation of Scotland’s Flow Country
became a major UK issue. Valuing the wetland habitat,
and how land use change affected it, became a target for
contingent valuations (Hanley and Craig, 1991).
The received wisdom, then, was that respondents to
questionnaires should be given information about the
ecosystem they were valuing, to allow informed evalua-
tion (Hanley, 1995). Typically, stated values increased
with the amount of information given (though Price
(2001) recorded an explicably contrary result).
In one exercise - intended to explore the weaknesses of
the method rather than to derive a meaningful answer -
respondents were asked their willingness to pay to main-
tain the ecosystem in its pre-afforested condition (Price,
1999). More information was given, and the question
repeated, with the usual higher valuation. Respondents
were then asked to divide their value among various cate-
gories of ecosystem services: regulating and supporting
ones, various aspects of cultural ones, and the intrinsic
values which have been the object of much misunder-
standing (Price, 1997). Values from the sample were initi-
ally scaled up to the population of Western Europe, which
it could be argued was the relevant one, since the area
supported half the European breeding population of one
species, the greenshank (Tringa nebularia (Gunnerus)).
Some results are presented in Table 3.
The aggregate value, almost £68 billion, was nearly
10% of the UK’s then GNP. This, if taken seriously,
would have constituted an invincible case against affor-
estation, and led to suspicion that the valuation was
symbolic: respondents were loading general concern for
environmental conservation onto this issue, because the
questionnaire offered their only opportunity to express
that concern.
Much willingness to pay was allocated to cultural ser-
vices and intrinsic values, and some to services which
should have been included in other valuations (Price
(1999) gives details). The remaining value was attributed
to various regulating and supporting services. But a
question now arises: even after a summary had been
given of the ecosystem’s significance (but not of how
afforestation would affect it), how could respondents
realistically evaluate such services? Environmental scien-
tists and economists may spend a lifetime on trying to
understand these things, and at the end would admit
that they understand them but imperfectly. What there-
fore is actually being valued is not regulating and sup-
porting services in themselves, but the value placed by
the respondents on their knowing of those services, and
a warm glow attributed to doing what they could to
maintain those services. Consumer-citizens should assist
in valuing the services themselves, not by considering
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habitat and processes, but through willingness to pay for
the results of regulation and support (freedom from
flooding, products of agriculture etc), as embodied in
the approaches outlined in the sections above on mar-
ketable benefits and financial costs.
Supposing that a warm glow is what respondents eval-
uate. To what population is it relevant? The answer is,
only the people who are aware of the Flow Country and
the issues surrounding it, and thus who could feel the
warm glow about the preservation of the habitat. The
extent of knowledge of the Flow Country was tested by
asking respondents directly whether they knew it.
Because they might prefer to appear knowledgeable
rather than ignorant, their real familiarity was tested by
asking them to identify characteristics of the area. The
responses made clear that many were thinking of the
Low Countries: only the proportion of the sample who
evidently did know about the Flow Country was
included as relevant. (This is the correct means of deal-
ing with the much-discussed so-called aggregation pro-
blem: bulking up questionnaire responses to the
appropriate population. It avoids artificial definition of
the spatial limits of relevant population, without requir-
ing the absurd assumption that all Earth’s inhabitants
are equally affected by what may be a very local issue.)
The answer was refined by disaggregating the respon-
dent population according to their geographic origins,
and applying the proportion of aware respondents in
each origin to its population. Because the highest level
of awareness was found only in the small Scottish popu-
lation, this further reduced value.
Finally, willingness to pay was reduced to the pre-infor-
mation level, which would be typical of the vast majority
of the population who did not encounter the question-
naire. The resultant figure for regulating and supporting
services was only 0.5% of the total value initially derived.
Because of symbolic response, even this figure would
be overstated. The warm glow is implanted by focusing
environmental concern onto a particular ecosystem. This
warm glow would doubtfully be maintained for the Flow
Country: it would be transferred when other conservation
issues came to the forefront of respondents’ minds, with
the advent of some other controversy.
By giving scientific information about regulating and
supporting services, the questionnaire seems to redefine
the role of respondents, as “scientific experts” (a role which
they could not reasonably fulfil). It appears to absolve real
experts of the need to value processes and conditions, and
replaces that with responses from the public that could
never be better than a wild guess. And yet experts still feel
they should promote an educated wild guess: so, within the
present ethos of consumer-citizen valuation, they may
favour imparting a thimbleful of knowledge.
Afforestation of the Flow Country might not have been
beneficial: the provisioning services were of limited value
in a severe environment; carbon loss from the peaty soil
might have outweighed that gained in tree biomass. But
the value of preserving the status quo was here much
exaggerated by uncritical application of the consumer-
citizen questionnaire approach outlined above. In parti-
cular, effects on regulating and supporting services of
both the pre-existing wetland ecosystem, and of its forest
replacement, should have been evaluated through other
approaches, applied by experts.
Certification premiums: selling the unknown
Stated or revealed willingness to pay a premium for cer-
tified timber represents a similarly contestable role for
consumer-citizens, but within the context of the volun-
tary subscriptions approach outlined above. To translate
willingness to pay for a product into willingness to pay
for ecosystem services requires both that researchers
know how much of the premium is attributed by consu-
mers to enhanced ecosystem services, and that consu-
mers themselves know how their payment relates to
actual service delivery.
A pilot questionnaire on motivations for paying a pre-
mium for certified timber received responses as in Table 4.
Many responses related to processes other than delivering
ecosystem services.
How paying a certification premium relates to quantita-
tive service delivery is even less clear. Many respondents
Table 3 A breakdown of the value ascribed to preserving the Flow Country
Components included in value Aggregate value (£million) Proportion of initial value (%)
All 67 900 100
Cultural service values 23 300 34
Doubled-counted values 7 500 11
Intrinsic values 16 600 24
Regulating/supporting values 20 500 30
... for those with prior knowledge 3 062 4.5
... adjusted to geographical zones 545 0.9
... at pre-information level 307 0.5
Source: modified from Price (1999)
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claimed to know both the volume of timber required to
make certified products, and the forest area and time-span
needed to grow this volume. (They were less clear that
certification would in fact secure the desired outcomes.)
But the only respondent to express substantial ignorance
about all these crucial mappings, from premium purchase
to ecosystem service delivery, was a (realistic) professional
expert in marketing and certification. Perhaps other
respondents exaggerated their level of knowledge?
It is even doubtful whether product labelling was under-
stood. Wieland (unpubl.)iii found that many respondents
could not identify Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) or
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification
(PEFC) logos; did not know the implication of FSC or
PEFC registration; and even identified “dummy” logos as
being associated with sustainability.
Consider further, that the benefit of enhanced ecosystem
services, like climate protection associated with personal
purchase of a unit of certified timber, accrues almost
entirely to other world citizens (the free-rider problem
again). Once again, willingness to pay for certified timber
is most plausibly attributed to the warm glow given by act-
ing rightly and responsibly towards planet and people.
Instead, follow through the alternative hypothesis: that
certification creates a market for the regulating and sup-
porting services of environmentally sustainable timber
production, and that this market functions effectively
according to the assumptions of neoclassical economics.
Suppose enhanced ecosystem services deliver a narrowly
self-interested benefit to the purchaser of certified timber
(as is deemed to motivate economically rational people in
a market system). Suppose that the premium willingly
paid is only €1 per m3. If all the world’s population bene-
fits equally, this implies a total ecosystem service benefit of
€7 billon per m3, and a benefit from all traded certified
timber of around €35 million million millon. Such a figure
is, of course, entirely implausible (it exceeds gross world
product by a huge factor), yet it really is the arithmetical
consequence of assuming that such markets for ecosystem
services function in the neoclassical manner.
Next, consider the distribution of certification pre-
miums. Suppose that a 20% price premium - representa-
tive of what has been found in surveys - exists on a
certified product costing €25 and embodying 10 kg of
roundwood. This translates into 20% × €25 × 1000/10 =
€500 per tonne of roundwood. But the actual premium
enjoyed by certified timber producers ranges from €1 to
€3 per tonne. This hardly translates willingness to pay
for ecosystem services, into an adequate incentive for
their delivery.
Hence certification seems to provide neither an effi-
cient value marker for the ecosystem services created by
certified forest management, nor an equitable distribu-
tion of payment for those ecosystem services. (Following
that second point, payments made in one reduced
impact logging project included no element for added
operational inputs, and so penalised the workers imple-
menting the project (Healey et al., 2000).)
If consumers have little idea how the certification pre-
mium relates to quantitative delivery of ecosystem ser-
vices, willingness to pay the premium is best interpreted as
a warm glow value for behaving ethically. There is an
implied request, that those who have appropriate expertise
should use other approaches (such as those outlined in the
sections above on marketable benefits and financial costs)
to estimate the actual value of regulating and supporting
services - and of all the social conditions and processes
which payers of certification premiums also desire.
Disservices to hydroelectricity
Foresters have long known that forests can ameliorate dis-
tribution of catchment runoff. Hydrologists have also long
known that conifers planted on windy, high rainfall sites
reduce total runoff. Law (1956), a water supply engineer,
reported reduced stream flow into a reservoir whose
catchment had been afforested. Hydroelectric engineers
reported less generation than was expected from gross
rainfall figures. The mechanisms of rainfall interception
and re-evaporation were investigated by Calder and
Newsom (1979) for the UK, reproducing results found in
other high rainfall environments.
Such losses compromise the energy balance for forests
planted on hydroelectric catchments. One sample revealed
a loss, over one forest rotation, of about 1012 joules per ha,
calculated as the extra energy input required at thermal
power stations, to replace the loss (Barrow et al., 1986).
Extensive sampling in the Scottish Highlands found that
lost streamflow reduced the number of afforestation sites
found profitable, from 11 out of 41 to 5 out of 41 (with
only direct cost of forgone generation) and to 3 out of 41
(including environmental damage from thermal genera-
tion). Clear policy guidelines arose from this ecosystem
disservice of planted forests: avoid afforesting hydroelectric
catchments altogether; or, if not possible, concentrate
Table 4 A premium for what?





Friendliness of production process to
environment
9
Friendliness of production process to people 8
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planting at sites of moderate rainfall, on catchments whose
hydroelectric schemes have low operating heads.
These results were never, to the authors’ knowledge,
contested; but neither were they accepted. Pearce (1991)
stated that “the data are not currently in a form that
enables valuation”. And that misleading assertion has
remained as the conventional wisdom of UK foresters to
this day.
Carbon benefits turned on their head
Carbon sequestration is prominent among the regulating
services of expanded forest area. At first sight it might
seem that benefits would be even greater, if the price
attributed to a carbon flux, into or out of the atmosphere,
were rising. Several reasons can be given for such a rise.
On the demand side, atmospheric CO2 may do more
damage through time, because a greater gross world pro-
duct and world population will be adversely affected. On
the supply side, abatement cost might rise, as the most
cost-effective measures are taken first, leaving progres-
sively more costly measures as the remaining options.
Price might be forced up in markets driven by govern-
mental requirements to achieve targets for net emissions
reduction. Such predicted price rises are now mandated
by some governments, for example, the UK Department
of Energy and Climate Change (2009).
The case is not simple, however. A commercial forest
cycle entails a period of sequestration, followed by revo-
latilisation of carbon when the crop is felled and its pro-
ducts decay or are burned (Price & Willis, 2011). If
revolatilisation occurs at higher prices than those for
sequestration, the overall economic carbon account is
negative.
This might seem just an accounting fiction, except
that lagged transactions between forests, their products
and CO2 sinks mean that a single forestry cycle leads to
higher atmospheric CO2, two or three decades after
final felling, compared with the “no-afforestation” base-
line. Thermal inertia (particularly of the oceans) means
that consequent warming and hence economic damage
are further delayed. If these results occur at a time
when one tonne of atmospheric CO2 really does cause
higher economic costs than one tonne now, then the
disservice of carbon volatilisation eventually outweighs
the service of carbon sequestration. Taking a thinned
crop of Sitka spruce with maximum productivity 12 m3
per ha per year, using coefficients of sink interaction
and thermal inertia from the scientific literature, and
projecting a 2% per year price rise for carbon, net
cumulative benefit turns to net cost after 170 years.
This effect has not been noted previously, probably
because economists normally discount future costs and
benefits at a higher rate than any rate of price rise: thus
future carbon fluxes are always “less important” than
present-day ones. The surprising result described above
is a joint consequence of both a high rate of price rise
for carbon fluxes, and a low discount rate for them. The
intuitive expectation might be that both these factors
would improve the case for forestry, but this is not the
outcome from methodical calculation using real-world
data.
Creating a normal forest structure, with equal areas in
each age class, does ensure that at no future time are there
net CO2 emissions from a forest and its products, and
thus never any higher atmospheric CO2 than would have
existed without afforestation. Then, the economic carbon
account is always positive. This emphasises the impor-
tance of viewing ecosystem services holistically, with sus-
tained forest growth, exploitation and replacement. Here,
foresters’ customary perspectives have important lessons
for environmental economists.
Price (in press) provides additional details from which
these conclusions are derived.
Conclusion: any morals for forest planters?
Economic valuation of ecosystem services is not intrinsi-
cally hostile to the deliberate protection or enhancement
of those services. On the other hand, such valuation
does not invariably favour a particular ecosystem, such
as a planted forest: there is potential for adverse, or sur-
prising results. The approaches to valuation need to be
applied, with due thought, in particular contexts. In
some cases planted forests will be favoured: in others
they will not be.
Cases have been described to illustrate the deployment
of valuation approaches, and to confront problems that
may arise. The aim has been to give balanced representa-
tion of cases that are, and are not, favourable to planted
forests; and of cases where approaches deliver a useful
result, and those where results may be misleading.
More research is needed of course. It must be free of
generalised valuations and prescriptions. Ecosystem ser-
vices should be valued in a specific physical and social
context.
i Price, C (unpublished manuscript) Economic valuation
of biodiversity: a consequentialist pilgrimage.
ii That is, any economic change which reduces well-
being: the opposite of a good.
iii Wieland, D (unpubl.). From Voluntary Certification
to Legislation: Preventing Trade in Illegally Obtained
Timber; and do the Public Really Know what they are
Purchasing when making Ethical Choices? Draft thesis,
Bangor University.
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